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Abstract 
How different are European welfare-to-work schemes from American ‘workfare’? 
This paper sets up a distinction between ‘compliance’ and ‘productivity’ orientations 
in programme design. It analyses communications between politics and administration 
in the conduct of schemes in the US, the UK and the Netherlands, identifying for each 
scheme the configuration of legal rights, performance management systems and 
financial arrangements. It is shown how institutional factors can explain why US 
‘workfare’ is compliance-oriented, an orientation achieved by distinctive performance 
targets and budgetary structures. Different institutional possibilities and constraints 
characterise the development of schemes in the UK and the Netherlands, which 
mainly have a productivity orientation, reflected in performance targets and financial 
incentives which reward placement in employment.  2 
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Introduction 
How different are European countries from the USA in their approaches to welfare-to-
work? In the eyes of many, the answer is ‘very’. At the level of discourse, there are 
clear differences. Annesley (2003) argues that the policy debate around the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA,1996) was 
dominated by a moralising discourse that dwelt on the damage done to the work ethic 
and family life by the long-term receipt of AFDC. By contrast, in Europe 
worklessness is often portrayed as a social problem with its roots in ‘exclusion’, a 
state of affairs that people do not necessarily choose for themselves. This discourse is 
promulgated by the European Commission, notably in its recent conversion to 
‘flexicurity’ (see e.g. CEC 2006) and its insistence that social protection can be ‘a 
productive factor, ensuring that efficient, dynamic, modern economies are built on 
solid foundations and on social justice.’ (CEC 2003: 3)  In presenting these ideas, the 
USA serves as a ‘contrast regime’ (Jacobsson 2004: 360). 
 
Moving from discourse to specific parameters of policy, commentators have drawn a 
distinction between welfare-to-work programmes that put ‘work first’, and ‘human 
capital’ programmes, which offer job-seekers training to improve their prospects of 
productive employment. Critical accounts of ‘work first’ programmes emphasise how 
benefit recipients may be pushed into low-paid, marginal work, whereas human 
capital programmes enhance skills and may produce better long-term outcomes 
(Handler 2003, Bruttel and Sol 2006). To some extent, programme rules signal 
whether a scheme is ‘work first’ or not, but it is also possible to read back from 
employment conditions to infer how welfare-to-work programmes will operate. Since 
the US labour market generates more offers of low-paid employment, a work-first 
approach is more viable than in Europe. 
 
Or so the argument goes. But this contrast between the US and Europe can no longer 
be drawn sharply, if indeed it ever was quite so clear. Generally, work first policies 
have become more widespread. Several European countries have taken steps to create 
entry-level employment opportunities where remuneration is considerably below the 
standards established in mainstream collective agreements, and rules that allowed 
insured unemployed and disabled people to turn down low-paid jobs have been 
tightened or removed. Freedland et al (2007: 225) summarise their survey of several 
European countries as ‘suggest[ing] a move towards increasingly coercive social 
security and labour market regimes, in which the freedom of the unemployed to 
choose their professional and vocational path is powerfully curtailed.’ At the same 
time, their analysis of ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ to work is inconclusive about the ways in 
which the balance has shifted. Social security benefits have always been conditional 
on duties to take up work, and it is hard to know how strongly these are enforced in 
practice. 
 
This paper proposes an alternative approach to comparing welfare-to-work schemes. 
Instead of focusing on the rules about whether a person must take up a job, it looks at   3 
the conditions governing conduct while on benefit. Benefit recipients may be offered 
services such as job search assistance and training opportunities; they may also be 
required to perform activities such as attending interviews and courses. It is surely the 
way the scheme is weighted between productivity-oriented offers and compliance-
oriented requirements which is of most comparative interest. A compliance-
orientation may result in ‘pushing people into jobs’, but it will also produce benefit 
terminations which are not matched by (recorded) job entries, as people turn to family 
and friends, informal work or crime. A productivity-oriented system should not 
produce these outcomes: instead, welfare rights will be protected while entry into 
employment is facilitated. 
 
This paper therefore endeavours to compare the extent to which welfare-to-work 
schemes in Europe and the USA are compliance-oriented or productivity-oriented. 
This focus for comparison calls for information about how schemes are designed and 
administered, rather than reading off predictions about schemes from political 
discourse or labour market conditions. This immediately presents a problem. Welfare-
to-work programmes generally increase opportunities for differentiated treatment of 
benefit recipients and vest discretion in the administrators who make decisions about 
the programmes that a recipient will be assigned to. This discretion may be associated 
with either intensified compliance or with more productive policies.  Since the 
workings of discretionary systems are notoriously difficult to research, it is hard to 
know which dominates. 
 
For some commentators, discretion is a veil behind which coercion can hide (Diller 
2000, Freedland and King 2003). This view tends to be held particularly by legal 
scholars who see the setting out of entitlements in clear rules and regulations as 
important to constituting welfare rights. A welfare administration operating in this 
‘legal-bureaucratic’ mode can make authoritative judgments about compliance, but 
also has built-in mechanisms for controlling the arbitrary exercise of power, so its 
pursuit of compliance will be mitigated by constraints of legality and accountability. 
By contrast, an administration with wide discretion can make arbitrary judgments 
about compliance without being restrained by the law. 
 
This reasoning suggests that we can compare welfare-to-work programmes by 
comparing their legal frameworks and identifying the residual discretion vested in 
administrators. However, this approach seems rather narrowly legalistic. It should be 
possible to find out something about the conditions shaping the exercise of discretion. 
Indeed, Diller himself, while vehemently attacking the discretionary provisions of 
PRWORA, notes that discretion is steered from above. ‘The accretion of power by 
ground-level workers may suggest a weakening of control by central authorities. 
Central authorities, however, have ceded less control than it may appear. Although 
ground-level workers have much greater authority in relation to recipients, central 
decisionmakers structure and channel the discretion that is exercised’ (Diller 2000: 
1127). Similarly, Freedland and King (2003: 471) argue that discretion is steered 
politically: they highlight the impact of a ‘moralistic, populist and censorious political 
discourse’. 
 
Without dismissing the importance of discourse, the approach taken in this paper is to 
look at two more concrete ways in which discretion may be steered: through 
performance management and financial arrangements. Again, Diller, and Freedland   4 
and King, acknowledge the importance of performance management. Diller notes that 
there has been a move towards ‘entrepreneurial government’, relying on incentives 
and targets rather than legal rules. ‘Proponents of entrepreneurial government have 
argued that, rather than exerting direct authority over tasks performed by lower level 
workers, central administrators should identify desired outcomes and shape the 
incentive structure so that workers strive to achieve these outcomes.’ (Diller 2000: 
1175). Freedland and King (2003: 471) remark that performance management 
systems may lead administrators to abuse their authority, particularly in the face of 
‘efficiency targets, such as reducing the caseload number’. But it is necessary to look 
beyond the mere existence of a performance management scheme and see what 
targets it sets and what incentives it creates, before we can conclude that the existence 
of such a system necessarily means that the welfare-to-work programme has a 
compliance orientation. 
 
Budgetary structures and other financial arrangements may also steer discretion. 
Compliance calls for the investment of administrative resources, which may 
potentially be ‘repaid’ with benefit savings. If administration and benefit budgets are 
separate, so that benefit savings cannot be anticipated in administrative spending, 
expenditure on compliance may be blocked (even while political discourse declares 
its importance). Contracts with private providers may allow for innovations in 
financial arrangements which get around blockages created by budgetary institutions. 
For example, contracts may reward private investment to obtain ‘results’ in the form 
of outcome-based contract payments. The incentives created by this structure depend 
on what ‘results’ are rewarded. 
 
This paper shows that comparison of the compliance- or productivity-orientation of 
welfare-to-work schemes is possible, by using the information contained in laws and 
regulations, performance management systems, and financial arrangements. In taking 
this approach, it also shows something else about how welfare-to-work schemes come 
to operate as they do. The compliance- or productivity-orientation of welfare-to-work 
schemes is not just the result of a political choice by a unitary government actor. The 
policy also depends on the availability of different modes of communication between 
the government and the administration. For example, devolved budgets which 
combine administrative and benefit expenditure into a single item are probably the 
strongest way to create a compliance orientation. But a compliance-oriented 
government may not have the option of budgetary devolution, and is therefore unable 
to implement its preferences in this way. Another example: legislation can spell out 
rules and procedures that allow administrations readily to enforce compliance; 
however, a government may not be able to pass this legislation due to conflict 
between the executive and the legislature. 
 
This institutionalist perspective highlights that we should not think of a government 
with given preferences choosing the most effective mode of implementation. Some 
modes may be constitutionally available in some countries and not others. Some may 
be blocked or shaped by conflicts between arms or levels of government. Any 
administrative structure will be affected by information asymmetry. Uncertainty about 
‘what works’ implies that powers should be delegated to those able to find the best 
ways to achieve the government’s objectives; however delegation brings its own 
constraints in the form of limitations to the available designs of incentive structures 
for the delegate or agent.   5 
 
Delegation and discretion 
In the following discussion, it is argued that administrative discretion is shaped and 
channelled by a variety of controls, or more neutrally communications, coming from 
politics. We can get a good idea about how discretion will be exercised by looking at 
the different communications that street-level administrators receive. Laws and 
regulations are one mode for such communication, but there are two others which 
have been important in the design of welfare-to-work programmes. One is the 
performance measurement system that administrators work under, which sets targets 
and creates incentives. The other is the financial structure, particularly the way that 
any benefit savings from welfare-to-work programmes are treated in the budget. The 
orientation of the system towards compliance or productivity will depend on the 
settings of these three modes of communication. 
 
Theories of delegation suggest that conflict is central to explaining how particular 
communicative settings come about, whether these are conflicts between the 
legislative and executive arms of government or between the executive and the 
bureaucracy. Huber and Shipan (2002) suggest a possible answer to the question of 
why politicians would choose to delegate discretion to bureaucrats rather than passing 
detailed laws about how welfare-to-work programmes should operate. We can predict 
compliance-oriented discretion if (a) we assume that that the preferences of the 
executive arm of government determine the way that the administration exercises its 
discretion, and (b) the executive wants more emphasis on compliance than the 
legislature and (c) that the legislature can prevent the passage of a compliance-
oriented law. Discretion in this scenario emerges from constraints on the executive’s 
ability to deploy the weapon of legality because of conflict with the legislature. 
 
But the assumption that the administration is ‘aligned’ with the executive is hard to 
justify for a large unwieldy bureaucracy (it is more often applied to regulatory 
agencies).  Another possible conflict is the familiar one of ‘agency drift’, where the 
administration pursues its own objectives rather than following the policy direction 
established by the government. Dunleavy (1991) has argued that administrators will 
endeavour to maximise the slack in their ‘bureau’ budgets but will be indifferent 
about the size of programme budgets (such as the level of benefit expenditure). If 
welfare-to-work takes more administrative effort than following legal-bureaucratic 
procedures, we can predict that the administration will not invest effort in helping 
people to take up work. The government might counter this by earmarking spending 
specifically for welfare-to-work programmes and allocating it according to results. 
Alternatively, a devolved administration could be allowed to manage a ‘pooled’ 
programme and bureau budget, which can create incentives to invest administrative 
effort in getting people off benefits. 
 
In the absence of major conflicts in preferences, the government may choose to give 
wide discretion to the administration when there is uncertainty about the relationship 
between policy settings and desired outcomes (Huber and Shipan 2002: 88-90). This 
discretion will enable the administration to utilise its superior information to choose 
the best policies. However, the desired outcomes still need to be communicated 
clearly, which may be achieved through performance management. In principle, any 
policy preferences can be communicated through performance targets. However, this 
paper shows that in practice performance management systems tend to emphasise   6 
outcomes or ‘results’; in other words, they exhibit a bias towards productive 
outcomes. One explanation is that those who are involved in designing, regulating and 
auditing performance measures are technocratically-minded policy actors, and this 
influences the way that these systems work.  
 
A government that faces conflicts in preferences with the administration, for example 
because the administration is under the control of local government or the social 
partners, may look to introduce private providers. Contracting-out may enable the 
government to combine performance management with stronger financial incentives 
than are available within the existing bureaucratic structure. It might seem that 
privatisation is a means of radical institutional reform that allows politicians to choose 
and implement their goals more freely than if they are working within existing 
implementation structures. However, managing the information asymmetry with 
private providers introduces its own limitations to what the government can do, if it is 
not to find the policy impeded by problems such as cream-skimming.  
 
The political theory of delegated discretion suggests that discretion may be either 
compliance-oriented or productivity-oriented, depending on the preferences of the 
executive and the constraints created by conflicts with the legislature and/or the 
bureaucracy. Lawyers, by contrast, have tended to assume that discretion, by 
undermining rights, makes a system more compliance-oriented. One reason for this 
view is that legal modes of communication are regulated by courts and monitored by 
welfare rights organisations. This constrains the way that legal communications are 
used and helps to protect claimants’ rights. However, this is not the only way in which 
welfare-to-work programmes are regulated and monitored. A feature of these 
programmes has been the intensity with which they have been evaluated. Evaluators 
monitor programmes and give verdicts on their outcomes, and the normative 
orientation of evaluation is strongly productivist. This bias is even more pronounced 
when private providers are involved.  Information asymmetries and incomplete 
contracts limit the extent to which the government can communicate compliance-
oriented preferences to private providers. 
 
In the following discussion, the administrative structures for welfare-to-work 
programmes in three countries are reviewed. In each country, institutional 
arrangements raise different issues. In the US, the key conflicts are marked out 
between the legislature and the executive (Congress and the President) on one hand, 
and between the federal government and the states on the other. It is shown that all 
three modes of communication between politics and administration are found, but 
there has been a shift away from outcome-oriented performance management, which 
was accompanied by extensive evaluation research, with the adoption of new 
budgetary arrangements which dominate the relationship between the federal 
government and the states. 
 
In the UK, the key relationship is between the government (since the executive 
dominates the legislature, no distinction is made) and the administration. The 
government has to overcome informational asymmetries favouring the administration 
to achieve its goals. Legal communications have been directed towards compliance 
goals, while performance management has been adopted to promote productive goals. 
Notable also is the government’s lack of flexibility in the use of budgetary 
arrangements to pursue its goals in welfare-to-work.   7 
 
In the Netherlands, the changing relationship between the government and the social 
partners has been the key factor in reforms to the institutional structure of welfare-to-
work as they have affected insured people. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
the government sought to replace the existing social partner-dominated 
administration. It has done this in part by bringing in private providers of employment 
services, working under contracts designed to produce employment ‘results’. Welfare-
to-work programmes have also been extended for social assistance recipients. There 
central government has regarded the municipalities as agencies susceptible to a high 
degree of ‘drift’, which it has sought to manage primarily by changes in budgetary 
arrangements. 
 
 
The United States 
The passage of PRWORA in 1996 was the culmination of two significant changes in 
the relationship between state and federal political actors in US welfare-to-work 
policy. One change was signalled by Congressional agreement on new legislation on 
welfare, where in previous years welfare-to-work schemes had been adopted under 
the waiver provisions of old legislation. The other change came from the rise of the 
‘states’ rights’ movement. The combined impact of these changes was that work 
participation requirements were explicitly spelled out in legislation, yet, at the same 
time, more discretion was delegated to state administrations. This curious 
combination of legislative stringency and delegated discretion arose from the way that 
different modes of communication were used. Although the legislative framework 
became more oriented towards work participation, this was done by specifying work 
requirements as performance measures, not as legal-bureaucratic rules to be followed. 
 
The changes to the three modes of communication outlined above can be summarised 
as follows. First, legal-bureaucratic communications which constituted individual 
claimant rights were reduced with the removal of ‘entitlement language’ from welfare 
provision, which, inter alia, curtailed the scope for judicial regulation and monitoring. 
Second, the role of performance management was substantially changed. Under the 
waiver programme, the outcomes of schemes – specifically, their impact on welfare 
recipients’ participation and earnings – had to be evaluated. Under PRWORA, certain 
performance targets had to be met: most importantly, a target for the proportion of 
recipients participating in work schemes. This shifted the preformance focus from 
outcomes (recipient incomes etc) to outputs (numbers on schemes). Third, budgetary 
communications were changed significantly too, with a shift from matching federal 
funding under AFDC to block grants under TANF. The availability of block grants 
was tied to performance measures, whereas previously matching funds had been tied 
to compliance with legal-bureaucratic arrangements (checks on identity, family 
circumstances and means) for ensuring that payments were only made to eligible 
recipients, which were audited by the federal authorities. 
 
In AFDC, there were strict rules on eligibility in some respects (eg the application of 
means tests) but not on requirements for mothers to actively seek and be available for 
work or to participate in education and training programmes. Instead, states could 
introduce such measures under waivers, where they were evaluated according to 
outcomes. Furthermore, mothers had an entitlement to assistance until their youngest 
child was 18. This provision was removed by TANF, but it was not replaced with a   8 
corresponding rule about entitlement based on work participation. Instead, it was 
transformed into a rule about the aggregate indicators that a state administration has to 
work within. These indicators provide that everyone with a continuous claim of two 
years should be entered into a work programme, but this is subject to a ‘caseload 
reduction credit’ meaning that some recipients can be exempted. Similarly the 
cumulative five-year limit on federal cash assistance is accompanied by some 
flexibility: states can allow up to 20% of the caseload to fall outside this limit (Diller 
2000; Handler 2003: 231). The federal law reduced its legal communications about 
the rights (and duties) of individuals, making their basis for qualifying for benefits 
less certain, while increasing its monitoring of administrations. 
 
Under TANF, work participation requirements are expressed as a formula which 
relates the performance target that a state has to achieve to the aggregate evolution of 
its caseload. The ‘caseload reduction credit’ operates such that the level of 
participation in work programmes that states have to achieve to obtain their federal 
grants falls as the welfare rolls fall. After 1996, there was a substantial increase in 
lone mother employment and a reduction in numbers on the welfare rolls. One 
consequence was that many states no longer had to implement and enforce welfare-to-
work measures to receive block grants. By 2005, only 11 states had to engage more 
than 10% of welfare recipients in work activities (Crisp and Fletcher 2008: 7). Some 
states have used this leeway to move away from compulsory workfare. Washington 
State discontinued its work-for-benefits programme, and high-profile schemes have 
also ended in New York and Wisconsin (Crisp and Fletcher 2008: 11).  
 
Why did states discontinue their work programmes when they could? One possibility 
is that they were not productive: they did not raise recipients’ earnings prospects 
sufficiently. However, we can expect that states would evaluate not productivity but 
cost-effectiveness, ie whether the spending on programmes paid for itself in reduced 
future benefits. Thus both employment outcomes and ‘diversion’ effects, where 
programmes cause people to leave welfare without entering employment, would be 
valued by states. The evidence assembled by Diller (2000) suggests that states 
invested heavily in deterrence and diversion activities, aiming to stop people making 
an initial claim for welfare and getting them off as fast as possible. Work programmes 
are not necessarily cost-effective methods of diversion, compared with investing more 
in administrative checking on claims, imposing requirements to attend meetings with 
case workers, and establishing other bureaucratic procedures that make claiming more 
difficult. 
 
In the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, which finally reauthorised PRWORA, Congress 
‘recalibrated’ the caseload reduction credit, rebasing it at 2005 levels and thereby 
eliminating states’ accumulated credits. Without credits, states must place half of all 
cases with adults and 90 percent of two-parent families in work activities (US HHS 
n.d.). It also tightened the rules for verifying compliance, particularly regarding the 
definition of ‘work activities’ and the reporting of hours of work.  
 
Why did Congress seek to reassert work participation requirements, instead of leaving 
the states to make their own policy choices, based on cost-effectiveness? In other 
words, having established a clear incentive to control spending through the budgeting 
structure (the block grant), why did Congress add a further communication in the 
form of performance management? One answer is that work participation   9 
requirements were costless to Congress. There was no financial reason not to express 
a policy preference for work participation, since it would fall to the states to meet the 
cost of complying. Indeed, if they failed to comply, proportions of the block grant 
could be withheld by the federal government. Another answer is that work 
participation requirements are a rhetorical restatement of the productive goals of 
PRWORA; rhetorical because the budgeting structure gives the strongest signal and 
produces a compliance orientation. We can see that the financial relationships 
between levels of government in the US did not create an incentive for productive 
policies. At the level of state governments, the block grant created an incentive to 
adopt cost-effective compliance-oriented policies, notably deterrence, mitigated 
perhaps by recognition that the costs of destitution might appear locally in other 
forms. At the level of the federal government, a political preference for work 
requirements could be expressed regardless of whether they were cost-effective.  
 
It is interesting to contrast the way in which administrators’ discretion is fettered and 
directed by budgetary communications under PRWORA with the communications 
which governed the prior waiver programmes. The waiver programmes waived 
requirements about spending money on verified cash payments to recipients in favour 
of allowing states to divert funds to work-related programmes. States obtained block 
grants for these programmes, rather than continuing to obtain matching funding. This 
gave states a financial incentive to get people off benefits and into work. Thus the 
financial arrangements were very similar to those operating under PRWORA; the 
contrast is in the ways in which the exercise of discretion by state administrations was 
monitored and evaluated. 
 
Evaluation calls for definition of valued outcomes, and the desired outcomes from 
waiver programmes were defined in a distinctive way. Among politicians, the desired 
outcomes could include diversion, deterrence and detection of unfounded claims as 
well as increased employment rates and earnings. However, only the latter outcomes 
were ‘admissable’ in evaluation studies. A comprehensive study by Bartik (1995) of 
performance measurement in welfare-to-work programmes shows how 
administrations were steered by measures with a ‘positive sum’ orientation. Measures 
used include rates of entry into employment and ‘follow-up’ employment, hourly and 
weekly earnings at follow-up, entry into employment with health insurance coverage, 
and reductions in benefit grants due to employment. Reductions in benefits not linked 
to employment do not feature. It was taken as given that the performance indicators 
must be designed to measure how the administration ‘adds value’. 
 
For researchers, measuring added value presented difficult technical problems. It is 
hard to work out exactly what the impact of programmes really is, given that many 
people will leave benefits without the aid of programmes (the ‘deadweight’ issue). 
Research findings under the waiver programme produced their own controversies, 
particularly about the relative merits of ‘human capital’ programmes that offered 
training versus those that focused on getting people quickly into work (the former 
were claimed to produce more sustained long-term benefits, but the measurement of 
long-term effects is even harder to separate from confounding influences). Critics also 
argued that programme results were distorted by cream-skimming, and controlling for 
cream-skimming and deadweight effects became the main preoccupations of 
researchers. 
   10 
Thus there were debates and differences within the frame of productivity-oriented 
research on welfare-to-work. The disagreements over ‘work first’ policies may have 
been fuelled by a sense that these were more likely to ‘harass’ people into leaving 
benefit, even though this did not count as a positive result unless it was accompanied 
by a transition into work. Discussions about sanctions were also fitted into this ‘value-
added’ framework, with researchers evaluating their effect on recipients’ eventual 
levels of welfare (see eg Moffat 2002).  In this debate, sanctions leading to low 
income counted as a negative outcome. Thus politically controversial features of 
waiver programmes were fitted into processes of scientific evaluation, shaping policy 
towards productive outcomes. 
 
The considerable effort invested in evaluation research at this time might be taken to 
suggest that the delegation was motivated by uncertainty, with policy-makers 
endeavouring to use demonstration projects to obtain information about which policy 
settings would produce the desired outcomes. However, evaluations were also a 
control mechanism. The design of evaluations can be seen as a strategy by federal 
technocrats to restrain the impact of anti-welfare political feeling in the states. The 
Department of Health and Human Services funded several major evaluation projects 
(Greenberg et al 2003: 359-60). Requiring states to comply with evaluation research 
designs and frame their initiatives in value-adding terms would restrain them from 
taking drastic measures to reduce welfare rights. 
 
The design of evaluations also suggests that the federal government wanted 
information about ‘what worked’ but that it did not want to place discretion in the 
hands of street-level administrators who were under the control of state governments. 
For example, in some of the leading evaluation studies, administrators were required 
to assign people to programmes randomly, instead of being able to exercise their 
judgment about where to direct participants (a judgment which they could, in 
principle, exercise productively or coercively). Evaluating states’ ‘demonstration’ 
projects allowed for methodological innovation, with evaluators, notably the MDRC, 
pioneering the use of experimental methods adapted from the natural sciences 
(Friedlander and Burtless 1995: vii). Leading figures at MDRC such as Judith Gueron 
became strong advocates of experimental methods, particularly random assignment. 
More generally, the federal system produced an abundance of ‘experimental’ material, 
with different states, and localities within states, adopting programmes which could 
be compared (Greenberg et al 2003). Advocates of research-based approaches sought 
the formulation of ‘pilot’ or ‘demonstration’ projects which would generate data. 
 
However, the opportunity to use these data to set federal parameters to ensure that 
states had to implement ‘productive’ programmes was closed off by PRWORA. 
Gueron (1999: 26) noted that ‘the 1996 law, with its combination of block grants and 
the end of the Section 1115 waiver process, dramatically changed the funding and 
incentive structure that supported random assignment studies in the past. While block 
grants create pressure on states to figure out what works, the politicization of the 
welfare debate pushes in the opposite direction.’ The welfare debate was ‘politicized’ 
in the sense that rules on rates of participation in work schemes were imposed for 
reasons independent of their potential value-added (and without any requirement to 
monitor or evaluate their value-added). A major review of evidence by MDRC in 
1993 had come out largely against compulsory participation in schemes as a condition   11 
for receiving benefits (workfare), but this was ignored. Policy-makers’ aims had 
swung strongly towards a compliance orientation. 
 
Did block grants create pressure on states to figure out ‘what works’, as Gueron 
suggested? Not exactly. States had other incentives and constraints to respond to: 
specifically, those arising from the transition from matching to block grant funding. 
Whereas scientific evaluation and performance measurement systems focused on 
employment results, the management of  block grants created incentives to achieve 
reductions in caseload by any means. States had little reason to concern themselves 
with what happened to people once they left benefits, a fact reflected in the 
inadequacy of state-level data on the fates of welfare recipients. State information 
systems show lower employment rates and higher numbers leaving for ‘unspecified’ 
reasons than survey data generated by independent studies. 
 
The evolution of welfare-to-work programmes in the USA allows us to compare two 
modes for steering delegated discretion: through the use of performance indicators 
and evaluations, and through budgetary controls. It is clear that the two modes operate 
quite differently. Some of the visibility and accountability that lawyers find in the 
legal-bureaucratic system is also present in a performance indicator-based system. By 
contrast, the steering of discretion by budgetary communications has led to a strong 
compliance-orientation and a reduction in welfare rights.  
 
The United Kingdom 
Compared with the US, welfare-to-work measures in the UK have been implemented 
by a central government executive which is not constrained by political conflict with 
the legislature. We do not find the legislature restraining the executive by writing 
detailed laws; indeed, the general tendency in social security is for legislation to 
become less detailed, with the executive making extensive use of delegated 
legislation. What we find instead are issues with the way that the executive – 
specifically, ministers – exercise control over the administration. In the following 
discussion, these issues divide into two groups. First, there is the standard question of 
how to align bureaucratic performance with the objectives of the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions. Second, there is the influence of conflict and competition 
within cabinet: specifically, how the allocation of resources to welfare-to-work may 
be determined in the light of other spending priorities, and the role of the Treasury in 
influencing this through budgetary arrangements. 
 
It might seem at first sight that the Secretary of State should have few problems 
controlling agency drift, given that there have been no evident limits on the 
government’s ability to put in place the legislation and regulations it chooses. 
However, what we find is that, under Labour, ministers sought to achieve their 
objectives in part by moving away from bureaucratic instructions towards a 
performance management approach. This contrasts with the approach taken under the 
Conservatives, where bureaucratic procedures were relied upon. A key benefit reform 
from the Conservative era was the introduction in 1996 of Job Seekers Allowance 
(JSA), which formalised the conditionality of benefit receipt in individualised 
Jobseekers Agreements, as well as further reducing insurance benefits (Walker and 
Wiseman 2003: 9). The primary orientation was towards compliance, and the primary 
means were legal communications with the bureaucracy. The reforms tightened   12 
centralised control over procedures. ‘Interventions by the state were both more 
exacting and more carefully scripted than before’ (Considine 2001: 38).  
 
The Labour government elected in 1997 also used legal-bureaucratic means to 
achieve its welfare reform goals. The programme of extending a ‘work focus’ to other 
categories of benefit recipient than the unemployed was implemented partly by the 
standard legal method of changing the eligibility conditions for benefits and levels of 
entitlement. For lone parents, the age of the child at which the parent is exempt from 
participation requirements is being lowered in stages. Incapacity benefits were also 
reformed: the legal content of changes in eligibility conditions is limited, but 
entitlement has been reduced for some people early in their claim. 
 
However, the government also used other means to implement welfare-to-work 
policy. Walker and Wiseman (2003: 10) remark that, ‘[o]nce in power, Labour rapidly 
came to believe that the machinery of government frustrated their goal of work-
oriented reform.’ The government was able to push through changes in the working 
practices of the public bureaucracy, introducing a new performance management 
system. Following on recommendations made by John Makinson, a senior publishing 
executive, the government introduced an incentive scheme for staff in Jobcentres 
(later, after merger with the Benefits Agency, Jobcentres Plus, JCP). Under this 
scheme, district teams receive bonuses related to the performance of their offices. 
Performance is evaluated with reference to the targets set by the government for the 
Agency as a whole, which are defined on five dimensions: job entry, customer 
service, employer outcome, business delivery and ‘fraud and error’. These dimensions 
are a mixture of process and results targets. Job entry is the major ‘result’. The 
‘business delivery’ dimension includes a number of process-oriented criteria around 
such things as accuracy of benefit payments, timely booking of interviews, and 
following-up on failure to attend interviews (Burgess et al 2004: 9-12). Thus 
incentives were created both to ensure claimants’ compliance with benefit rules and to 
achieve productive outcomes in the form of employment. 
 
The public employment service was put under further pressure to produce 
employment ‘results’ by creating competition with private providers. For example, 
since 2000, the government has run a scheme called Action Teams for Jobs, where 
teams can earn a flat fee of £2000 for each job entry (Casebourne et al 2006). Initially 
the scheme involved 40 Jobcentre Plus teams and 24 from the private sector, enabling 
the performance of public and private sector teams to be compared and evaluated. The 
emphasis on systematic evaluation is reminiscent of the ‘waiver phase’ in US welfare-
to-work policy.  
 
The government also had to navigate some conflict within the Labour Party about the 
compliance aspects of welfare-to-work policy. There was division between those who 
adopted a ‘moralising’ discourse, arguing that the legitimacy of the welfare state was 
undermined by evidence that some people abused its provisions, and those who 
wanted to see a clear departure from the policies of the previous Conservative 
government. The issue presented the dilemmas of the ‘Third Way’ in microcosm. One 
way in which the Third Way could be made concrete was by involving voluntary and 
community organisations in the welfare state. This was reflected in the first contracts 
to deliver welfare-to-work services, where Labour showed a preference for not-for-
profit and voluntary organisations over commercial firms (Peck and Theodore 2001:   13 
442). The government also defused potential conflict over the ‘work first’ thrust of its 
measures by adopting two major policies to ‘make work pay’, introducing a national 
minimum wage and greatly extending the availability of in-work benefits through tax 
credits. 
 
At first sight, there is little scope in the UK for the government to use budgetary 
arrangements to communicate its welfare-to-work preferences to the administration. 
Money for the incentive schemes described above had to be found within existing 
administrative budgets, which constrained their scope. The basic financial structure 
was that benefit payments were financed under their own budgetary heading, while 
welfare-to-work programmes received separate cash allocations. Furthermore, these 
allocations were not put on a permanent footing. The first major welfare-to-work 
initiative, the New Deal, had an explicitly temporary basis, as it was funded by a 
windfall tax on the excess profits of privatised utilities. The subsequent issue of how 
much money to allocate to welfare-to-work helps to account for the curious drive to 
switch towards private providers, as will now be explained. 
 
Whereas the first welfare-to-work contracts had favoured the voluntary sector, as 
explained above, from 2000 onwards the government experimented with more 
strongly incentivised arrangements with private for-profit firms. This presents a 
puzzle, as private providers were viewed with suspicion by many of the government’s 
own MPs, and their involvement would therefore seem to invite, rather than deflect, 
political controversy. There was concern that private providers sometimes had strong 
incentives to deem benefit recipients as failing to cooperate when they were referred 
to employment and training schemes. Such failures would be notified to JCP and 
could result in benefit sanctions being imposed. This concern focused particularly on 
Employment Zones  (EZs), which the government initiated in 2000. Private 
contractors in EZs are allocated funding equivalent to 21 weeks of benefit payments, 
so that they make a profit if they place claimants before 21 weeks are up (Griffiths 
and Durkin 2007: 17). Conversely, contractors are liable for a ‘malus’ deduction for 
up to five weeks if people are still on benefit when the 21 weeks are up (the EZ 
contract runs for up to 26 weeks). This apparently created an incentive to expel 
uncooperative participants. By removing such people from the programme, providers 
could reduce the risk of incurring malus charges, as well as providing information to 
JCP that could lead to loss of benefits.  
 
In practice, JCP’s desire to receive such information was countered by the knowledge 
that providers who removed participants from their programmes could be cream-
skimming. When the concerns of welfare rights groups were raised in Parliament, by 
the Liberal Democrat representative on the committee reviewing EZ regulations, the 
Minister replied that contractors ‘know and understand how we expect the sanctions 
regime to be applied and the degree of flexibility and understanding that must be 
applied to people who face significant and particular barriers to work.’ (Minister for 
Work 2004, Column 12)  The implication is that JCP is not receptive to ‘letter of the 
law’ compliance information from providers. Since providers have their own 
incentives to deem a person uncooperative, any resulting bias has to be countered by 
establishing working relationships with providers which discourage them from cream-
skimming and limit their responsiveness to the incentive to expel people. 
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As in other areas of British public policy, much of the drive for the involvement of 
private providers in welfare-to-work schemes came from the Treasury. One motive 
for Treasury to involve the private sector, beyond the desire to put competitive 
pressure on public bureaucracies to be more efficient, was that private contracting 
could also be used to ensure that welfare-to-work programmes did not establish 
entrenched claims on public spending regardless of their effectiveness. The risk that 
schemes might not ‘pay’ could be shifted to the private sector. 
 
The preference for the private sector and the preference for time-limited rather than 
permanent spending commitments came together in an initiative to adopt ‘invest to 
save’ funding of welfare-to-work programmes. ‘Invest to save’ is a budgeting 
mechanism whereby departments can bid for extra funds for programmes that will 
bring future savings for other parts of the fisc. For example, extra resources for fraud 
detection were obtained by the Department of Work and Pensions using an ‘invest to 
save’ rationale. The process involved moving funds from ‘annually managed 
expenditure’ (AME) which is driven by commitments and therefore includes social 
security benefits, to ‘departmental expenditure limits’ (DEL) which are fungible 
amounts subject to cash totals. Welfare-to-work programmes would seem to be 
natural candidates for the mechanism, but only if ways could be found to ensure that 
savings really were achieved and demonstrated. The risk was that up-front 
expenditure on programmes would be made while subsequently commitments to pay 
benefits could not be escaped if programmes failed.  
 
This risk could be shifted onto the private sector if private providers could be found 
who were prepared to accept ‘payment by results’ contracts. A report by David Freud 
(2007) advocated that a substantial increase in funding for welfare-to-work could be 
achieved on this basis. Only employment ‘results’ would count, so the policy had a 
productive orientation. Because of the cream-skimming risk noted above, providers 
would not be rewarded if their welfare-to-work programmes served to reveal doubtful 
claims and caused people to leave benefit without entering recorded employment. 
Thus the desire to shift the ‘invest to save’ risk, which meant that private providers 
had to be found, also shaped the policy towards productivity rather than compliance. 
 
As it is turning out, it seems likely that the private sector will not accept the risk of 
these contracts in the economic downturn (Timmins 2009, Timmins and Barker 
2009). The government will either have to contract for places on a fee-for-service 
basis or reduce its commitment to provide schemes for long-term unemployed people. 
If results-oriented thinking dominates, then the latter is possible, as the returns to 
investment in welfare-to-work probably fall in economic downturns, as there are more 
work-ready people available to take up vacancies.  
 
In summary, the involvement of private providers in welfare-to-work programmes 
under Labour gave the programmes a productivity orientation, contrary to the fears of 
some commentators. The proximate reason is that providers were given contracts 
which rewarded employment results, rather than benefit savings. One explanation for 
this contractual structure was that the government was concerned about cream-
skimming. If providers were rewarded for providing information leading to benefit 
terminations, they would be inclined to ‘breach’ less cooperative or less well-
organised benefit recipients, and this would improve their own performance results. 
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This is not to imply that the private sector cannot be involved in the administration of 
a compliance-oriented welfare-to-work programme. In Australia, compliance with the 
‘Mutual Obligation’ relies on ‘Work for the Dole’ placements arranged mainly 
through the voluntary sector. Providers must keep records of attendance and 
communicate ‘breach information’ to the benefit authority, which may apply 
sanctions for ‘participation failures’. However, the contractual structure is that 
providers are paid for services, not for results, so they do not have strong cream-
skimming incentives (Mabbett 2009). In the case at hand, we can see the converse of 
this: the UK Treasury’s desire to shift risk through payment-by-results contracts also 
dictated that the contracts must be oriented towards productivity rather than 
compliance. 
 
The Netherlands 
The politics of welfare-to-work reform in the Netherlands involve not just legislative-
executive and central-local political relationships, but also relationships between the 
government and the social partners. From the 1980s onwards, the Dutch welfare state 
has come under ongoing pressure for reform arising from high levels of expenditure 
and high rates of inactivity among the working age population. Critics have argued 
that institutional relationships between the government and the social partners have 
contributed to these problems. They claimed that employers and unions had misused 
the system to subsidise the process of reducing and restructuring industrial 
employment. Employers had sought to place people on disability benefits to avoid 
redundancy costs, and unions had cooperated in this. ‘[T]he intimate ties between 
sectoral industrial relations and payroll social security were deployed as an 
institutionalised support structure, allowing the social partners to externalise the costs 
of economic adjustment onto the social security system’ (Hemerijk 2003: 245).The 
result was that, by the start of the 1990s, ‘the role of social partners in the 
administration of social insurance [..] was seen as a major barrier for realizing the 
policy objectives of central government’ (van Berkel and van der Aa 2005: 333). 
Dominant among these policy objectives were the need to increase employment 
creation and reduce long-term benefit receipt among working-age people. The focus 
of measures towards the latter objective was on tightening up conditions for 
qualifying for benefits, but, by the 1990s, welfare-to-work programmes were also on 
the agenda. 
 
Huber and Shipan (2002: 191) suggest that, in corporatist systems, the need for 
detailed legislation is reduced because it is possible to resolve conflicts during the 
implementation process. The converse of this argument would be that, if the interests 
of the government and the social partners diverged, the government would seek 
legislative authority to direct the administration according to its preferences. 
Somewhat surprisingly in the light of institutionalist arguments about the difficulty of 
welfare state retrenchment, there have been a number of clear and significant cuts in 
provision (Vis et al 2008). These cuts have been implemented by coalition 
governments with members drawn from across the political spectrum, and political 
parties have sometimes paid a high electoral price for participating in governments 
which have undertaken unpopular measures. For example, the tightening of the rules 
on eligibility for disability benefits contributed to electoral losses for both the 
Christian Democratic (CDA) and Social Democratic (PvdA) coalition partners in 
1994.  
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The PvdA survived its electoral setback to participate in the ‘Purple’ coalition of left 
and right parties, headed by Wim Kok (1994-2002). However, Hemerijk (2003) 
argues that the party then pursued institutional reforms rather than engaging in further 
‘programmatic’ cuts in benefit levels and eligibility conditions. A major impetus to 
institutional reform came from a critical national audit office report on social security 
administration, which was taken up in Parliament with the formation of the 
Buurmeijer Commission, an all-Party parliamentary inquiry, in 1993. The televised 
hearings had a considerable public impact and prepared the ground for a parting of the 
ways between the Social Democrats and the trade unions. The inquiry recommended 
that the administration of social insurance should be removed from social partner 
control and placed under an autonomous administrative agency, and this was done in 
a succession of measures in the 1990s. At the same time, the Kok government marked 
out its direction for social security reform with the slogan ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’. Much of 
the discourse was productivist, in that it was claimed that institutions dominated by 
labour market ‘insiders’ had taken actions which led to the exclusion of potentially 
productive people from employment. However, there was also a compliance overtone: 
the suggestion was that many of those receiving unemployment and disability benefits 
did not really qualify and should be pressed to return to employment.  
 
The government engaged in a succession of administrative reforms to social 
insurance, eventually (in 2002), drawing all the insurers into a single public body, the 
UWV, a measure described as ‘the biggest nationalisation since the Second World 
War’ (Struyven and Steurs 2003: 17). It also privatised parts of the system, placing 
more of the costs of sickness absence and disability directly onto employers. Other 
steps in the legal-bureaucratic mode were taken in the area of disability criteria and 
assessment. A succession of changes to rules and practices in the assessment of 
disability have been adopted to try to reduce the numbers on benefit. Consistent with 
its view that the existing insurance arrangements externalised costs onto the public 
fisc, the government considered the possibility of privatising the whole insurance 
system, including the assessment of the entitlement to benefits. This was proposed in 
one round of reform proposals (SUWI 1), but rejected because of the difficulty of 
creating appropriate incentives for correct administration and financial control. 
Financial reforms, such as cash limits on benefit expenditure, were also ruled out. 
 
Steps in the legal-bureaucratic mode related to welfare-to-work included the 1996 
Fines and Measures Act (Wet Boeten en Maatregelen, WBM) which spelled out rules 
about job search activity and defined ‘suitable work’ that could not be refused without 
penalty (Sol and Hoogtanders 2005: 159). However, other decisions about how 
welfare-to-work programmes would be implemented have pointed much more 
towards a productive orientation. This is particularly a result of the decision to 
privatise provision, which can be understood as one result of the conflict between the 
government and the social partners over social insurance. 
 
A reform of the Public Employment Service (PES) had been launched in 1991 with 
social partner participation. This reform was intended to reorient the service towards 
providing placement services for recipients of social security benefits, leaving the 
provision of mainstream services (purchased by employers and used by employed as 
well as unemployed people) to the expanding private employment agencies. However, 
this reform was deemed a failure in an official report in 1995. According to Hemerijk 
and Vail (2006: 75), ‘[t]he social partners were furious about the [report’s] critique,   17 
which led the ambitious Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Ad Melkert, to seek alternative solutions rather than patching up 
incipient corporatist arrangements.’  
 
Melkert introduced a new mode of financing for the PES, creating a ‘purchaser-
provider split’ in which the five predecessor organisations of the UWV purchased 
services from the PES as provider. This created elements of payment-by-results 
(Hemerijk 2003: 256).  Competition was initially limited, with only 20% of 
reintegration funds available for contracting with other providers than the PES, but 
this limitation was lifted in 2000 (Sol and Hoogtanders 2005: 143). An open market in 
which the remains of the old PES tendered to provide services alongside private 
competitors was implemented in the Work and Income Implementation Structure Act 
(Structuur Uitvoering Werk en Inkomen, SUWI ) which came into force in 2002.  
New providers were able to enter the market, including those who had developed their 
business base in temporary agency work. These providers could, in theory, facilitate 
reintegration through their location as intermediaries in a more flexible labour market. 
The idea was that, by requiring the insurers (later, UWV) to tender openly for 
contracts, practices which had kept benefit claimants out of the labour market would 
be combatted. 
 
Reforms to Dutch employment services have come to the attention of researchers 
because extension of private provision has been accompanied by a strong orientation 
towards ‘payment by results’ or ‘no cure, no pay’ as it is often called in the Dutch 
debate. Furthermore, in the earliest rounds of contracting, private providers were not 
required to go through a prescribed set of procedures with claimants. The ‘trajectory’ 
(the set of measures available to claimants) was up to the provider to determine, 
subject only to the requirement that there should be a personal interview and a plan 
for reintegration. Critics pointed out that providers could ‘park’ claimants for whom 
the costs of finding a job are expected to exceed the reimbursement payable. Expert 
commentators have been critical of the performance of the Dutch employment quasi-
market, pointing out that there is evidence of cream-skimming and poor service 
provision to those who are hardest to place (Tergeist and Grubb 2006; Grubb 2004; 
Sol and Hoogtanders 2005: 164). 
 
In summary, the reforms to employment services created a highly productivity-
oriented system in which providers played little role in ensuring that benefit recipients 
were complying with rules on seeking and being available for work. One possible 
explanation is that the government was concerned to make privatisation a success by 
ensuring that providers could enter and adopt strategies that achieved ‘results’ even if 
this involved cream-skimming and ‘parking’.  
 
Hemerijk’s (2003: 264) verdict on the reforms is as follows: ‘All social insurance 
arrangements now operate under one public roof, whereas the reintegration of the 
[un]employed and disabled workers is the responsibility of private organisations. […] 
Unmistakably these reforms have re-established political primacy in the area of social 
security.’ This assessment of ‘political primacy’ is made with reference to the social 
partners, whose role is clearly much diminished. But the reliance on private 
contractors for welfare-to-work schemes can be seen as bringing its own constraints 
on the ability of the government to implement policies in accordance with its 
preferences. Compared with, say, the British JCP performance management system,   18 
which rewards compliance effort (reflected in ‘business delivery’ targets) as well as 
employment results, the Dutch structure only rewards results. This has created its own 
set of policy problems, notably cream-skimming and quality control. The government 
is dependent on refining financial mechanisms to combat cream-skimming, and has 
also turned to market mechanisms for quality control, for example by promoting 
choice for service users.  
 
In summary, the political discourse around welfare-to-work in social insurance was 
ambiguous, but the policy as implemented has proved to be productivity-oriented. It is 
a different story in social assistance, where central government has been able to use 
changes in budgetary arrangements to create new constraints on local authorities, and 
market mechanisms play a much smaller role. At the beginning of the 1990s, social 
assistance benefits were largely financed on a case-by-case basis by central 
government, but central government gradually introduced block grant elements to 
create financial incentives for more rigorous administration (Mabbett and Bolderson 
1998). By 2007, the financing mechanism had fully shifted to a block grant. 
 
Central government also sought to promote welfare-to-work provision for social 
assistance recipients. A requirement to contract out 70% of employment service 
provision was imposed on the municipalities in the SUWI Act of 2002, at the same 
time as it was imposed on UWV. However, the municipalities lobbied against the 
contracting-out requirement, and in 2006 it was dropped. It has also been found that, 
where municipalities do contract-out, they make little use of payment-by-results 
(Tergeist and Grubb 2006: 17, 47).  
 
The explanation of why contracts with private providers play a different role in the 
social assistance system lies in the budget constraint on municipalities. The block 
grant places the full marginal cost of claims on the municipalities, which creates a 
strong incentive to spend resources on compliance. This contrasts with the situation in 
the insurance system, where UWV has no direct financial interest in sanctioning 
claimants (Struyven and Steurs 2003: 22). As noted above, private contractors with 
contracts which reward employment results have incentives to ‘park’ customers, 
rather than going through procedures which will generate information about 
participation failures. 
 
To some extent, this problem can be countered by designing contracts in which 
private providers must go through specified procedures, and where rewards are 
weighted to ensure that all claimants in the cohort receive services (as in ‘accelerator’ 
models – see Grubb 2004).  However, as in the British case, there remains a potential 
problem with the private providers’ incentives to supply information. If the private 
provider is dependent on the recipient’s cooperation to achieve its targets, it has an 
incentive to raise the threat of sanctions and seek to enforce obligations to cooperate. 
However, from the perspective of the benefit paying authority, this incentive may be 
too strong to produce reliable information. The public authority needs to ensure that 
any denial of benefits is legal, and this may make it reluctant to act on information 
supplied by providers (Sol and Hoogtanders 2005: 159). 
 
At the same time, there is evidence that Dutch municipalities use some of the 
‘diversion’ strategies identified by Diller in the US states. McGonigal and van 
Paridon (2008) examine the changes in administration that occurred in Rotterdam and   19 
The Hague between 2003 and 2006. They found that there has been an increased 
emphasis on administrative measures to reduce fraud, leading in particular to the 
denial of more claims at the initiation stage. In Rotterdam, new claimants were 
visited, whereas previously initial claims handling had been left to the CWI. In The 
Hague, there was a significant increase in the proportion of initial claims being 
denied. They suggest that the focus of administration had shifted, from helping people 
to find jobs to reducing the numbers dependent on social assistance (McGonigal and 
van Paridon 2008: 11, 16). 
 
Conclusion 
The argument of the paper is that institutional arrangements create distinctive 
opportunities and constraints on how welfare-to-work programmes can be 
implemented, and these in turn shape the orientation of the programmes towards 
compliance or productivity. One mode of implementation relies on rules and 
regulations. This ‘legal bureaucratic’ mode can be used to ‘script’ contacts between 
the administration and the benefit recipient, and thereby establish a strong emphasis 
on compliance with rules. It is possible to use this method in implementing welfare-
to-work schemes, but it is not the dominant mode.  
 
This paper has shown that there are several methods for shaping the incentive 
structure of the administration to promote welfare-to-work. One is to adopt a 
performance management scheme to reward administrators for achieving desired 
results. These results may be outputs (e.g. numbers participating in programmes) or 
outcomes (numbers entering employment). The rewards at stake may be personal or 
organisational and will depend on budgetary arrangements. These arrangements may 
allow (anticipated) benefit savings to be invested in increased provision of welfare-to-
work services, but they may also be invested in other types of administrative effort, 
notably ‘diversion’. 
 
One might imagine politicians choosing from the menu of incentive designs to arrive 
at the arrangement that best suits their goals, including the relative weighting of 
productivity and compliance. However, the three country cases discussed here suggest 
that politicians do not have a free choice from the menu. The most powerful 
compliance-oriented budgetary arrangement is to give a lower level of government a 
block grant out of which to pay for benefits, work schemes and other administrative 
costs. This arrangement has been established in the US and in Dutch social assistance, 
but not in the UK. There has been occasional discussion of the possibility of 
devolving social security budgets to local level, but this is blocked. It requires 
appropriate political conditions: in the US, the states’ rights movement; in the 
Netherlands, the marginality of social assistance created by the wide coverage of the 
insurance system. 
 
One of the most striking features of the case studies is that performance management 
schemes very often reward employment outcomes, rather than reductions in caseloads 
or exits from benefits. This creates a productive, rather than a compliance orientation, 
because sanctions and denials of benefit are not rewarded unless they contribute to an 
entry into recorded employment. The most extreme case of an employment results-
oriented system was the one in operation in Dutch social insurance, where the 
emphasis on results meant that cream-skimming and parking was tolerated. The 
reasons why Dutch politicians chose this strongly productive orientation can be seen   20 
to lie in their conflict with the social partners, which they have sought to manage by 
promoting private provision. 
 
The UK has also adopted performance management, but without such a strong bias 
towards privatisation. Indeed there are examples where the public provider competes 
with the private sector on a more-or-less level playing field. This suggests that 
politicians had a relatively free hand to design an incentive structure that met their 
goals, without being constrained by other political conflicts. However, the 
government’s studied neutrality regarding public and private provision and declared 
focus on ‘what works’ produced its own constraints. It was keen to legitimate its 
approach to provision by ensuring that programmes were properly evaluated, putting 
welfare-to-work under the sustained scrutiny of the evaluation research community. 
The emphasis on evaluation indicates that there is significant uncertainty about the 
relationship between policy settings and outcomes, which, according to delegation 
theory, points to the desirability of granting discretion to bureaucrats. The argument 
here is that the presence of an evaluation community constrains the exercise of 
discretion as well as justifying it. Evaluation imposes a strong productivity-orientation 
which is reflected in the design of performance management systems. 
 
The evaluation research undertaken in the UK was strongly influenced by its US 
counterpart, which had thrived under the waiver programmes that operated prior to 
PRWORA. The requirement on states to evaluate systematically the outcomes of 
welfare-to-work measures allowed under ‘waivers’ of federal rules and requirements 
can be seen as a control mechanism by the federal technocracy, which promoted 
technical policy analysis. PRWORA changed all that, creating a structure where the 
states have strong incentives to adopt a compliance-orientation and where they are 
relatively unconstrained by legal communications from the federal government which 
have previously constituted basic welfare rights.  
 
In summary, the USA has turned out to have the institutional potential for a strongly 
compliance-oriented system, while both the UK and the Netherlands have tended 
towards more productivity-oriented arrangements. Thus, to some extent, the received 
view on the contrast between Europe and the USA is upheld. However, it is also clear 
that European countries are not institutionally immune to compliance-oriented 
welfare-to-work policies, although the institutional opportunities and constraints are 
quite different in the UK and the Netherlands. 
 
 
References 
 
Annesley, Claire (2003). 'Americanised and Europeanised: UK Social Policy since 
1997', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5:2, 143–65. 
 
Bartik, Timothy (1995). Using Performance Indicators to Improve the Effectiveness 
of Welfare-to-Work Programs, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
Bruttel, Oliver and Els Sol (2006). 'Work First as a European Model?: Evidence from 
Germany and the Netherlands', Policy and Politics, 34:1, 69-89 
   21 
Burgess, S, C Propper, M Ratto and E Tominey (2004). Evaluation of the introduction 
of the Makinson incentive scheme in Jobcentre Plus: Final Report, Bristol: CMPO 
 
Casebourne, J, S Davis and R Page (2006). Review of Action Teams for Jobs, Leeds: 
DWP 
 
CEC (2003). Strengthening the social dimension of the Lisbon strategy: Streamlining 
open coordination in the field of social protection, Brussels: Commission of the 
European Communities. 
 
CEC (2006). Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, 
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. 
 
Considine, Mark (2001). Enterprising States: The Public Management of Welfare-to-
Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Crisp, Richard  and Del Roy  Fletcher (2008). A comparative review of workfare 
programmes in the United States, Canada and Australia, Leeds: DWP. 
 
Diller, Matthew (2000). 'The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion 
& Entrepreneurial Government', New York University Law Review, 75:5, 1121-220. 
 
Dunleavy, Patrick (1991). Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. 
 
Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran (1994). 'Administrative Procedures, 
Information, and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 38:3, 
697-722. 
 
Freedland, Mark, Paul Craig, Catherine Jacqueson and Nicola Kountouris (2007). 
Public Employment Services and European Law. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Freedland, Mark and Desmond King (2003). 'Contractual governance and illiberal 
contracts: some problems of contractualism as an instrument of behaviour 
management by agencies of government', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27:465-
77. 
 
Friedlander, Daniel  and Gary Burtless (1995). Five Years After: The Long-Term 
Effects of Welfare-to-Work Programs. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Freud, David (2007). Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: Options for the 
future of welfare to work, Leeds: DWP  
 
Greenberg, David , Robert  Meyer, Charles  Michalopoulos and Michael  Wiseman 
(2003). 'Explaining Variation in the Effects of Welfare-To-Work Programs', 
Evaluation Review, 27:4, 359-94. 
 
Griffiths, Rita and Stuart Durkin (2007). Synthesising the evidence on Employment 
Zones, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 449, London: DWP 
   22 
Grubb, David (2004). 'Principles for the Performance Management of Public 
Employment Services', Public Finance and Management, 4:3, 352-98. 
 
Gueron, Judith (1999). The Politics of Random Assignment: Implementing Studies and 
Impacting Policy, New York: MDRC. 
 
Handler, Joel (2003). 'Social Citizenship and Workfare in the US and Western 
Europe: From Status to Contract', Journal of European Social Policy, 13:3, 229–43. 
 
Hemerijk, Anton (2003). 'A paradoxical miracle: The politics of coalition government 
and social concertation in Dutch welfare reform', in Sven Jochem and Nico A. Siegel 
(ed.), Konzertierung, Verhandlungsdemokratie und Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat: 
Das Modell Deutschland im Vergleich. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 
 
Hemerijk, Anton and Mark Vail (2006). 'The Forgotten Center: The State as Dynamic 
Actor in Corporatist Political Economies', in Jonah D. Levy (ed.), The State after 
Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Globalization and Liberalization. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Huber, John D and Charles R Shipan (2002). Deliberate discretion? The institutional 
foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jacobsson, Kerstin (2004). 'Soft regulation and the subtle transformation of states: the 
case of EU employment policy', Journal of European Social Policy, 14:4, 355–70. 
 
Mabbett, Deborah (2009). 'Telling Tales from Abroad: Australia, the Netherlands and 
the welfare-to-work proposals in the UK', Benefits, forthcoming. 
 
Mabbett, Deborah and Helen Bolderson (1998). 'Devolved social security systems: 
Principal-agent versus multi-level governance', Journal of Public Policy, 18:2, 177-
200. 
 
McGonigal, J.I  and C.W.A.M. van Paridon (2008). 'Social welfare reform in the 
Netherlands: a success?' Social Policy Association  42nd Annual Conference, 
Edinburgh, June 23-25, 2008. 
 
Minister for Work (Desmond Browne) (2004) Responses to questions on the Draft 
Employment Zones Regulations 2004, Second Standing Committee on Delegated 
Legislation, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm200304/cmstand/deleg2/st040323/40323s01.htm 
 
Moffitt, Robert A. (2002). The Role of Randomized Field Trials in Social Science 
Research: A Perspective from Evaluations of Reforms of Social Welfare Programs, 
Conference on Randomized Experimentation in the Social Sciences, Yale Institution 
for Social and Policy Studies, New Haven. 
 
Peck, J and N Theodore (2001). 'Exporting workfare/ importing welfare-to-work: 
exploring the politics of Third Way policy transfer', Political Geography, 20:427-60. 
   23 
Sol, Els and Yolanda Hoogtanders (2005). 'Steering by Contract in the Netherlands: 
New Approaches to Labour Market Integration', in Els Sol and Mies Westerveld (ed.), 
Contractualism in Employment Services: A New Form of Welfare State Governance. 
The Hague: Kluwer. 
 
Sol, Els and Mies Westerveld (2005). Contractualism in Employment Services: A New 
Form of Welfare State Governance. The Hague: Kluwer. 
 
Struyven, L  and G Steurs (2003). The Competitive Market for Employment Services 
in the Netherlands, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No 
13, Paris: OECD 
 
Tergeist, Peter and David Grubb (2006). Activation Strategies and the Performance of 
Employment Services in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 42, Paris: OECD 
 
Timmins, Nicholas (2009). 'Welfare-to-work body denies it wants new bids', 
Financial Times, February 9 2009. 
 
Timmins, Nicholas and Alex Barker (2009). 'Warning on welfare-to-work scheme', 
Financial Times, February 2 2009 
 
US HHS (Department of Health and Human Services) (n.d.) The Next Phase of 
Welfare Reform: Implementing the Deficit Reduction Act Of 2005 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/welfare.html, accessed 7 February 2009. 
 
van Berkel, R  and P van der Aa (2005). 'The marketisation of activation services: A 
modern panacea? Some lessons from the Dutch experience', Journal of European 
Social Policy, 50:4, 329-43. 
 
Vis, Barbara, Kees van Kersbergen and Uwe Becker (2008). 'The Politics of Welfare 
State Reform in the Netherlands: Explaining a Never-Ending Puzzle', Acta Politica, 
43, 333-56. 
 
Walker, Robert and Michael Wiseman (2003). 'Making welfare work: UK activation 
policies under New Labour', International Social Security Review, 56:1, 3-29 
 